


SECRET

26 OCT 1977

Alvin J. [Signature]


MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Conventional Forces
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Letter to General Dixon

3 NOV 1977

1. Attached is a draft letter to General Dixon on pushing to revive the Mitre study (which I believe I have in my files) which tried to move from static indicators towards more dynamic ones regarding the balance of air capabilities in Europe. I'd appreciate your looking at whether we could or should employ Mitre or anyone else to improve on that methodology and use the latest information available.

2. I appreciated the efforts in your paper for me to do something of that, such as the employment of the Soviets "combat capability rating." We don't know how they got that but they must have done something such as I'm talking about. (I do wonder how you go from their capability rating chart which shows the F-4E superior to anything but Flogger and Fencer, the F-104/105 equal to everything else, and the F-14/F-15 at least 2 1/2 times better than anything the Soviets have to a "summed combat effectiveness" in which the Soviets have passed us.) Clearly, you've done the mathematics properly but we must have an awful lot of F-100s around, which is the only aircraft on the chart of lesser capability than some of the Soviets'.

3. Thanks.



STANFORD TURNER

Attachment

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

*Alvin J. [Signature]***SECRET**

D R A F T

General Robert J. Dixon, USAF
Commander, Headquarters Tactical
Air Command
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665

Dear Bob,

At the risk of having my head chopped off (!), I'm enclosing a very brief study memorandum that just came across my desk and which brought to mind one of the comments in your famous letter to me of 9 August. You said in the third paragraph, "For example, they fly more training sorties than our pilots and receive more simulator training." The attached study does not dispute that but does contend that the individual duration of training flights is shorter and that there are fewer "combat-related training events."

On another point you make about devoting more attention to a short/no-warning Pact attack, we are about to complete a fairly extensive study on this subject. It considerably downplays the emphasis we've had in recent years on the short or no-warning attack. We simply believe that the disadvantages to the Soviets of going off in 24-48 hours are not compensated by the initial surprise and gains that they might make. I believe Dutch Huyser's recent work has come to a similar conclusion. I'll send you a copy of that study when it is finally printed. (NOTE FOR Please make a tickler on that.)

Finally, in terms of the overall balance of capabilities, I must say that I still have the impression that we are considerably ahead in the potential for delivering ordnance on targets and enemy territory. I simply believe that despite their improved avionics, range/payload and weapons, most of the Warsaw Pact's tactical aircraft would have considerable difficulty delivering ordnance against NATO targets in a hostile air defense environment without being under positive ground control. Clearly, this would be very inhibiting to them. Perhaps I am overly influenced by the Mitre study we discussed because it stressed this point of positive control and of accuracy of delivery. I'm still of the feeling that it would be wise to update that study or do one using similar methodology. It seems to me we need some more dynamic indicator of the comparative capabilities of NATO and Pact air forces than just the usual static indicators of numbers of aircraft tempered with data on range/payload, avionics and weaponry.

As always, all the best.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	23/10/77
TO: NIO/CF			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS:			
<p><i>See DC's memo to you, enclosed.</i></p> <p><i>Shivers 26 Oct</i></p>			
FROM: SA/1001			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.